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Regulating Japanese Automobile Imports: Some 
Implications of the Voluntary Quota System 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 1, 1981, the United States and Japan reached a voluntary restraint 
agreement (VRA)' which limits the volume of Japanese automobile exports to 
the United States over a three year period.2 This agreement was the culmination 
of U.S. efforts to alleviate the economic crisis which the U.S. auto industry faces. 3 
Implementation by the two governments of a voluntary quota to solve the auto 
trade problem raises several important legal Issues pertaining to international 
trade principles and U.S. antitrust law. 
Despite its utility as a means for restricting imports,4 the voluntary restraint 
I. The United States and Japan reached the agreement after two days of intensive negotiations 
between William Brock, U.S. Trade Representative, and Rokusuke Tanaka, Minister of International 
Trade and Industry. Japan Economic Journal, May 5, 1981, at I, col. I. A voluntary restraint agreement 
is a negotiated limit or quota enforced by the exporting party. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS: A COMPARISON OF STEEL, ELECTRONICS AND AUTOMOBILES III 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS]. A voluntary export quota provides 
temporary relief for domestic industries injured by the influx of imports. Smith, Voluntary Export Quotas 
ami U.S. Trade Policy -A New NontarijJ Barrier, 5 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 10, 14 (1973) [hereinafter 
cited as Smith]. 
2. N.Y. Times, May I, 1981, at I, col. 3. Japan's voluntary export restraint plan limited auto 
shipments to the U.S. to 1.68 million units in fiscal year 1981, down 7.7% from the 1980 record level of 
1.82 million units. Japan Times Weekly, May 9,1981, at 2, col. I. The first year quota of 1.68 million 
units is the average volume of car exports to the U.S. for fiscal years 1979 and 1980. Japan Economic 
Review, May 15, 1981, at I, col. I. In March 1982 the Japanese government announced its decision to 
extend the 1981 quota limits of 1.68 million units through fiscal year 1982. Boston Globe, Mar. 30, 
1982, p. 56, col. 3. This decision is a modification of the terms of the original plan by which the limit for 
fiscal year 1982 would have been the 1981 quota of 1.68 million units plus a certain percentage of 
increased sales if the U.S. auto market had shown any recovery in the demand for domestic-built autos. 
N.Y. Times, May I, 1981, at I, col. 4. The Japanese government drafted the plan to reduce the severity 
of cutbacks for fiscal year 1982 in proportion to the expansion of the American car market. Japan 
Times Weekly, May 9, 1981, at 2, col. 3. However, Japan anticipated that the limits for fiscal year 1982 
would be the same as the limits on Japanese auto exports for fiscal year 1981 because of the substantial 
decline in U.S. auto sales and mounting trade tension between the two countries. Boston Globe, Mar. 
30, 1982, p. 56, col. 3. In addition, the Japanese government notes that it will continue "monitoring 
shipments to the U.S." in fiscal year 1983 and stresses that the restraint measures "will never be 
prolonged beyond March, 1984." Japan Economic Journal, May 5, 1981, at I, col. I. 
3. See generally Hearings Before the Subcomm. of International Trade of the Senate Finance Comm. (pt. Il. 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, (pt. I)]; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
International Trade of the Senate Finance Comm. (pt. II), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Hearings, (pt. II)]. See also N.Y. Times, May 3, 1981,at 7, col. 3; Japan Times Weekly, May 16, 1981.at9, 
col. 3. 
4. See W. HUNSBERGER, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD TRADE 353-57 (1964) [hereinafter 
cited as HUNSBERGER]' See also text accompanying notes 17-25 infra. 
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agreement contravenes the United States' fundamental interest in preserving 
free markets· and its commitment to the international trade principles of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),6 of which the United States 
is a contracting party.7 In the interest of preserving an international trading 
economy based on open-market principles,s GATT prohibits any member from 
imposing a unilateral quota on imports.9 Since the United States has led the 
movement within GATT to eliminate trade barriers,10 any breach of the GATT 
agreement by the United States in instituting mandatory controls inevitably 
compromises its commitment to these goals. ll A crucial factor in connection with 
the auto trade dispute is, therefore, that the United States must implement a 
voluntary restraint agreement with Japan in order to conform to its international 
trade obligations under GATT. 
The voluntary restraint agreement has significant implications under U.S. 
antitrust law. The Sherman Act, the basic tenet of U.S. antitrust law, provides 
that any arrangement "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, [and] with foreign nations" is illegal pursuant to Section One of the Act. 12 
A critical question is whether the voluntary restraint agreement, which serves to 
insulate American producers from a major source of competition by restricting 
Japanese auto imports,t3 would be subject to antitrust charges as a "restraint of 
5. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,4-5 (1958). 
6. Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. See 4 
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) for the current text of this treaty and a 
complete table of amending protocols since 1947. GATT, a specialized agency of the United Nations, is 
an international organization based in Geneva. U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note I, at viii. 
Members of GATT pledge to work together to reduce tariffs and other barriers to international trade 
and to eliminate discriminatory treatment in international commerce. GATT, supra, preamble. An 
important principle of GATT is that protection of domestic industries is to be accomplished strictly 
through the customs tariff and not through other commercial measures, such as import quotas. R. 
BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 175 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
BALDWIN]. The only permissible exceptions to GATT rules are those dealing with balance of payments 
emergencies; GATT carefully supervises these exceptions. Id. at 31. See generally R. HUDEC, THE GATT 
LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975) [hereinafter cited as HUDEC]. 
7. GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1979 AND CONCLUSION OF THE TOKYO MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS (1973-1979), at 86 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GATT ACTIYITIES]. The signatories of 
GATT are contracting parties. Id. 
8. See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT 41 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 
JACKSON]. 
9. GATT, supra note 6, art. XIX. A contracting party may impose a quota only upon a finding of 
import-related injury. See § III infra. See also HUNSBERGER, supra note 4, at 354. 
10. See Recent Development. International Trade: GATT Legislation, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 687 (1979). 
11. See Hearings, (pt. II), supra note 3, at 44 (statement of Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of Com-
merce). 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973). 
13. Hearings, (pt. II), supra note 3, at 92 (statement of Robert M. McElwaine, President of the 
American International Automobile Dealers Association). Voluntary restraints would reduce japan's 
21.3% share of the U.S. automobile market to 1I% and thereby lessen the long-range competitive 
stimulus of imports upon U.S. domestic industries. Id. In addition, the American International Auto-
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trade" under the Sherman ACt.14 Several factors may prevent the voluntary 
restraint agreement from posing an antitrust problem. The U.S. Justice De-
partment asserts that a voluntary restraint agreement reached between the 
United States and Japan as a result of bilateral negotiations would be immune 
from antitrust liability if the foreign government effectuates the agreement 
through regulatory channels. 's Thus, the antitrust implications will turn on a 
factual determination regarding the degree of Japan's involvement in the 
negotiation process and in the enforcement of the quota through the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI),'6 the trade branch of the Japanese 
government. 
This Comment examines the legal implications of the voluntary restraint 
agreement. The author investigates U.S. attempts to impose a quota through 
legislation and the U.S. decision to seek voluntary controls in keeping with its 
commitment to the free trade principles of GATT. The antitrust implications in 
applying the voluntary restraint agreement are another important dimension of 
the problem. The author briefly reviews the executive authority to negotiate 
such an agreement and explores the various negotiating methods that are avail-
able along with the potential antitrust difficulties that each presents. In addition, 
the author discusses the manner in which the implementation of the bilateral 
agreement virtually precludes antitrust challenges. Major emphasis is focused on 
the unique role of MITI in its enforcement of the quota under Japanese law. 
Finally, the author considers the future of voluntary restraint agreements as 
effective devices to deal with market disru ptions created by the infl ux of imports. 
II. THE NEED FOR VOLUNTARY CONTROLS 
A voluntary restraint agreement is a negotiated limit or quota enforced by the 
exporting party.17 A VRA provides import relief for domestic industries for a 
mobile Dealers Association (AIADA) contends that a voluntary restraint agreement would have serious 
effects on the American consumer and on American businessmen and their employees in the imported 
car sector of the domestic automobile industry. [d. at 99. Consumers for World Trade (CWT), a 
national, nonprofit membership organization established in 1978, strongly opposes quotas on the 
grounds that quotas narrow the consumer's choice in the marketplace and artificially increase the 
purchase price of the product. [d. at 228. 
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973). For a general discussion of antitrust policy and its problems, see generally 
Donovan, Book Review, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 477 (1981) (reviewing B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, 
COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (1979); L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1976). 
15. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 156 (official letter from Assistant Attorney General john H. 
Shenefield, spokesman for the U.S. Department of justice). 
16. See I. MAGAZINER & T. HOUT,jAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY 38-40 (Policy Papers in International 
Affairs No. 15, 1980) [hereinafter cited as MAGAZINER & HOUT]. MITI is one of two major governmen-
tal agencies responsible for industrial policymaking. [d. For a discussion of the MIT!,s role in the 
japanese government's regulation of exports, see § IV.C.1 infra. 
17. U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note I, at x. 
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limited period of time. 18 Under the voluntary system, quota levels are not 
completely fixed. 19 The exporting nation retains some control in establishing 
quota levels and in raising ceilings on the volume of goods imported each year.20 
Because of the flexible nature of the VRA, exporting parties prefer this ap-
proach to other types of restraints, such as legislated trade barriers.21 
The voluntary restraint agreement is an established concept in the history of 
U.S.-Japanese trade relations.22 Since their introduction in 1956 and 1957 in the 
cotton textile trade between Japan and the United States,23 governments have 
applied VRAs to a number of items exported from Japan to the United States24 
and to several products exported from Japan to other markets, especially West-
ern Europe.25 A serious decline in U.S. auto sales26 and rising unemployment 
levels among auto workers27 led to the application of a voluntary restraint 
agreement for automobile imports in 1981.28 
A. The Automobile Industry in the Economies of the United States and Japan 
The automobile industry in the United States entered a deep recession In 
1980, when U.S. automakers reported losses of more than four billion dollars.29 
From 1978 to 1981, the U.S. annual production decreased by thirty percent to 
6.2 million vehicles.30 The collapse of domestic auto sales has caused the layoff of 
18. HUNSBERGER, supra note 4, at 360. 
19.Id. 
20. Id. at 355. 
21. Bates, The Voluntary Quota System for Regulating Steel Imports, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 101 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Bates]. 
22. See HUNSBERGER, supra note 4, at 353. See also C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 254 
(4th ed. 1968). 
23. HUNSBERGER, supra note 4, at 353. The concept of voluntary controls emerged from the long 
contest between the Japanese drive to expand sales in the American market and the efforts of American 
producers to limit those sales. Id. The United States and Japan first utilized the VRA in 1957 when 
Japan voluntarily limited its exports of cotton textiles. Id. Voluntary controls applied to a large part of 
world trade in cotton manufacturers as a result of the multilateral agreements in 1961 and 1962.Id. 
24. BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 42. VRAs apply to such diverse products as tiles, bicycles, metal 
tableware, baseball gloves and mitts, and umbrellas. Id. The most widely reported use of VRAs is the 
voluntary steel quota. /d. In 1968, the major steel producers of Japan and the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), an organization of nations which have pledged to pool their coal and steel 
resources to provide a unified labor market, agreed to limit their exports to the United States from 
1969-1971. Bates, supra note 21, at 101. In 1972, after additional negotiations, these steel producers 
extended the voluntary arrangement for an additional three years. Id. 
25. BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 41-42. Import controls apply to approximately 104 items imported 
from Japan to Italy; 47 items imported to France; and 22 items imported to Germany. Id. 
26. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1981, at DI, col. 2. For a discussion of the economic decline in the U.S. 
automobile industry, see § Il.A infra. 
27. Hearings, (pI. I), supra note 3, at 26 (statement of Sen. Donald W. Riegle). See § Il.A infra. 
28. Japan Times Weekly, May 16, 1981, at 9, col. 4. 
29. N. Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1981, at D I, col. 2. Sales of domestic cars were lower in 1980 than in any 
year since 1961. U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note I, at 92. 
30. Byron, How japan Does It, TIME, Mar. 30, 1981, at 54 [hereinafter cited as Byron]. The U.S. 
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nearly one million American workers31 and has dangerously weakened the 
industry's financial structure. 32 
In contrast to the domestic auto situation, imports continue to set sales re-
cords.33 In 1981, all imports combined accounted for 28.8 percent of the U.S. 
passenger car market.34 The Japanese auto industry is responsible for a major 
portion of the surge in im ports. 35 Since 1975 the annual share of Japanese cars 
increased from 800,000 to almost two million.36 Reports indicate that Japanese 
imports obtained a 23.7 percent share of the U.S. market in February 1981.37 
Projected at an annual rate, this share would amount to 2.2 million imported 
units sold in 1981, an increase of twenty percent from the 1980 record level of 
1.82 million units.38 Furthermore, the Japanese are expanding their production 
capacity to supply fifty percent of the U.S. small car market.39 This Japanese 
production increase threatens to cause a further loss of American jobs and a 
continued rise in the auto trade deficit with Japan, which presently stands at ten 
billion dollars.40 
Rising import levels have intensified industry demands for import relief.41 
Due to the U.S. auto industry's key role in the economy, the auto trade issue has 
national importance. 42 Auto industry supporters have also expressed concern 
automobile industry sold 9.3 million units in 1978 as compared with 6.2 million units in 1981. Henry, 
Hard Times in the Heartland, TIME, Dec. 7, 1981, at 31 [hereinafter cited as Henry). General Motors 
reported that its sales for November 1981, a total of 89,707, were down 33% from the same period of 
the previous year. Id. Ford sales were down 23.6% and Chrysler's were down 24%. Id. 
31. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 26 (Statement of Sen. Donald W. Riegle). From 1978 to 1981, 
300,000 auto jobs and 500,000 parts supplier and steelmaking jobs were lost nationwide. Henry, supra 
note 30, at 31. 
32. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 26 (statement of Sen. Donald W. Riegle). 
33. Hearings, (pt. II), supra note 3, at 144 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser, President of United 
Autoworkers (UA W)). Car imports have substantially increased during the last four years. U.S. INDUS-
TRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 1, at 53. Imported car sales have risen by 60% from 1.5 million units 
in 1976 to 2.4 million units in 1980.Id. In 1980, imports totaled 2.4 million units and absorbed 26.7% of 
the U.S. auto market, up from the 17.8% they took in 1978. Id. 
34. Hearings, (pt. II), supra note 3, at 35 (statement of Sen. Donald W. Riegle). 
35.Id. 
36. Byron, supra note 30, at 54. 
37. Hearings, (pt. II), supra note 3, at 35. In 1980, the japanese share represented 21.3% of the $70 
billion American car market, up from 12.2% in 1978.Id. at 144 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser, 
President of United Autoworkers (UAW)). 
38. Id. at 35 (statement of Sen. Donald W. Riegle). In 1981,japanese car sales in the U.S. totaled 1.9 
million units. Byron, Tempers Rising over Trade, TIME, Feb 1, 1982, at 58. A comparison of these actual 
statistics and the projected figures illustrate the effectiveness of VRAs in reducing the volume of 
japanese auto imports. 
39. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 26 (statement of Sen. Donald W. Riegle). 
40.Id. 
41. Schlosser, The Making of a Trade Dispute, JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE REpORT U .E.1. REP.), May 1, 
1981, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Schlosser). 
42. Byron, supra note 30, at 54. The influence of the U.S. automobile industry on the American 
economy is due primarily to its role as a major employer. Id. The auto industry employs one out of every 
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that the United States is likely to remam the primary market of Japanese auto 
exports 43 because most major western countries have already acted to restrict the 
importation of Japanese automobiles. 44 U.S. auto makers contend that without 
import restraints, Japan will divert its cars to the U.S. market in increasing 
numbers because the United States is the only truly open market in the world for 
automobiles. 4s 
B. U.S. Automakers' Plea for Import Relief Under the Trade Act of 1974 
In an effort to adjust to Japan's rising share of the U.S. car market,<6 the U.S. 
automobile industry47 has sought import relief under Section 201, the "escape 
clause,"48 of the Trade Act of 1974.49 Section 201 provides relief to domestic 
five American workers either directly or indirectly in making, servicing or selling cars, and industries 
such as steel, glass and rubber are heavily dependent upon automobile sales to keep their plants 
operating. /d. In addition, auto industry supporters argue that Detroit, the auto capital of the United 
States, has a strategic significance because General Motors, Ford and Chrysler also manufacture war 
materials for the U.S. Defense Department. Id. at 55. 
43. See Hearings and Markup Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and its Suhcomm. on Asian and Pacific 
Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
Hearings and Markup]. 
44. [d. Approximately thirty countries, including Australia, Brazil and Mexico protect their domestic 
car industry by local content requirements. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 110-11. A local content 
provision requires that the exporting nation's vehicles contain a certain percentage, ranging from 13% 
to 96%, of domestically produced auto parts. Id. France has limited Japan's share of the auto market to 
less than 3% by informal agreements.Id. at 138. Great Britain has successfully maintained an 11% limit 
through an agreement between British and Japanese auto manufacturers. Id. at 51. Because Canada 
imposes a 14% tariff on imported cars, the Japanese share of the Canadian auto market has reached 
only half the level it has in the United States. Id. at 138. Italy limits Japanese imports to 2,500 cars per 
year.Id. at 51. Italy's import restrictions were in force before the formation of GATT and served as a 
means of retaliating against some Japanese restraints on Italian exports. Id. Therefore, in accordance 
with GATT, Italy may continue to maintain this restriction. Id. Even Germany, which industrial 
European nations consider the greatest proponent of free markets in Europe, has a tariff rate of II %. 
Hearings, (pt. II), supra note 3, at 56. The U.S. tariff rate is only 2.9%. Id. 
45. Hearings and Markup, supra note 43, at 27. Japan is also a very closed market. Pine, Lawmakers 
Ponder "Reciprocity" in Trade, Wall St. j., Feb. 8, 1982, at I col. 5. Japan has begun only recently to 
liberalize import bal-riers in an effort to expand access to the Japanese market. Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Trade of the Ways and Means Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980). For example, Japan has 
eliminated its tariff on autos in 1978 and has agreed to eliminate tariffs on imports of almost all auto 
parts in 1981. /d. at 15. 
46. Hearings and Markup, supra note 43, at 188. The U.S. automobile industry claims difficulty in 
competing with the rapid influx of Japanese imports while it retools as part of its conversion to produce 
smaller cars. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 199. Domestic problems which the industry faces include 
the limited term for automobile loans and the imposition of a number of safety and emission-control 
regulations. Id. 
47. Representing the U.S. automobile industry in its petition to the U.S. International Trade 
Commission for import relief were Ford Motor Company, Chrysler Corporation and the United Auto 
Workers (UAW). Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 12, 1980, at I, col. 3. 
48. For many years, Congress has required the inclusion of an "escape clause" in each trade 
agreement. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 119, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
7186, 7263. The rationale for the "escape clause" is that the lowering of international trade barriers 
would cause serious injury, dislocation and perhaps economic extinction among some industries and 
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industries injured by import competition50 by authorizing the President to 
impose, or increase, duties,51 tariff-rate quotas,52 quantitative restrictions 
(quotas)53 and/or orderly marketing agreements.54 The Act also provides finan-
cial or technical adjustment assistance55 for American workers, companies and 
communities injured by increased imports.56 Furthermore, Section 203 of the 
Act limits each form of import relief to a duration of five years, in addition to a 
three-year extension.57 
Section 201 requires that parties seeking import relief submit a petition for 
eligibility for import relief to the U.S. International Trade Commission (lTC).58 
Upon receipt of this petition, the ITC then must investigate the matter.59 An 
affirmative finding by the Commission enables the President to grant import 
workers. [d. The "escape clause" provides temporary relief for an industry suffering from serious 
injury. or the threat thereof. so that the industry will have sufficient time to adjust to the freer 
international competition. [d. 
49. Trade Act of 1974 § 201.19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1980). The Trade Act of 1974 has replaced the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962. which expired in 1967, as the statutory provision giving relief to domestic 
industries injured by import competition. S. REp. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 52, 61, reprinted in 1974 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7186, 7196, 7205. The Act encourages open and nondiscriminatory 
world trade by providing safeguards for American industry and labor against injurious import competi-
tion. Sneaker Circus, Inc. V. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
50. Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1980). The escape clause addresses both the questions 
of injury and remedy. Trade Act of 1974 § 203, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1980). 
51. Trade Act of 1974 § 203, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1980). This Section allows the President to "increase 
duties to a maximum of 50% ad valorem above any previous rate." [d. 
52. [d. A tariff-rate quota differs from a quantitative restriction in that a tariff-rate quota combines 
the properties of a tariff and a quota in its application, whereas a quantitative restriction (quota) is a 
non-tariff trade barrier. See generaUy BALDWIN. supra note 6. 
53. See note 52 supra. Under § 203 the President may "impose a quantitative restriction that is not less 
than the most current quantity that was allowed ·to be imported in a period chosen by the President. 
Trade Act of 1974 § 203, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1980). 
54. Trade Act of 1974 § 203,19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1980). This Section allows the President to "negotiate 
orderly marketing agreements with foreign countries limiting the export of the articles to the United 
States. Orderly marketing agreements (OMAs) differ from VRAs in that U.S. customs officials monitor 
and enforce OMAs whereas the exporting country enforces VRAs. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 155 
(statement of Howard Samuel, President of Industrial Union, AFL-CIO). 
55. Trade Act of 1974 § 203, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1980). Adjustment assistance provides benefits to 
workers displaced by increased imports. S. REp. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
CODE & CONGo AD. NEWS 7186, 7205. Assistance includes job search, training and relocation allowances. 
[d. 
56. Trade Act of 1974 § 203, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1980). 
57. [d. 
58. Trade Act of 1974 § 201.19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1980). The U.S. International Trade Commission, 
formerly named the U.S. Tariff Commission, is an independent agency of the U.S. government 
charged with serving the President and Congress as an advisory, fact-finding agency on tariff, commer-
cial policy and foreign trade problems. S. REp. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 115-16, reprinted in 1974 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7186, 7259-60. The Commission not only advises on the possible effects 
of pending trade agreements or tariff legislation, but also investigates alleged damage to a domestic 
industry resulting from trade agreements in effect. [d. at 7263-64. 
59. Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1980). 
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relief. 60 To reach an affirmative finding, the Commission must determine that 
increased imports are a "substantial cause of serious injury (or threat thereof)"61 
to a domestic industry producing articles similar to, or directly competitive with, 
the imported articles.62 If the Commission finds a "substantial cause of serious 
injury,"63 it makes a recommendation to the President, who then determines if, 
and in what form, he will grant import relief.64 
In their petition to the U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S. auto 
industry representatives claimed that industry-wide record losses and high un-
employment figures were due principally to the increase in imports.65 After four 
days of formal hearings, the Commission decided on November 10, 1980 that 
the high level of imports did not constitute a substantial cause of serious inj ury66 
to domestic automobile manufacturers.67 In the three-to-two decision against 
60. Id. Section 201(b)(2) provides: 
In making its determination under paragraph (I), the Commission shall take into account all 
economic factors which it considers relevant, including (but not limited to) - .... (c) with 
respect to substantial cause, an increase in imports (either actual or relative to domestic 
production) and a decline in the proportion of the domestic market supplied by domestic 
producers. 
Id. 
61. Id. The Trade Act of 1974 applies a stricter standard than the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 
which only required a showing of "serious injury" for an affirmative ITC finding. Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 1821 (1980). 
62. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1980). First, an increase in imports, either actual 
or relative to domestic production, or a decline in the proportion of the domestic market supplied by 
domestic producers may show substantiality. Id. Second, the significant idling of productive facilities in 
the industry, the inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a reasonable level of profit, or 
significant unemployment or underemployment within the industry may demonstrate "serious injury.'· 
Id. Third, a decline in sales, a growing inventory, or a downward trend in production, profits, wages, or 
employment may show "threat of serious injury." /d. Fourth, "the domestic industry" may be only those 
subdivisions of the various manufacturers that produce the article in question, or the major geographic 
area in which the producers are located and in which the imports are concentrated. Id. The Commission 
may consider other factors at its discretion. Id. See also L. Jacobs & R. Hove, Remediesfor Unfair Import 
Competition in the United States, 13 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 1 (1980). 
63. Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.s.C. § 2251 (1980). For purposes of Section 201, the term 
"substantial cause of serious injury" means that the cause, either absolute or relative in character, must 
be at least equal in importance to any other cause of such injury. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 
120, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7186, 7264. See also Note, Title II of the Trade Act of 
1974; What Changes Hath Congress Wrought to Relief from Injury Caused by Import Competition, 10 J. INT·L L. 
& ECON. 197,231 (1975). 
64. Trade Act of 1974 § 202, 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (1980). In arriving at his decision, the President, who 
may consult with cabinet officers, must consider the following: 
/d. 
(I) the probable effectiveness of import relief; (2) the efforts being made to adjust to import 
competition; (3) the effect of import relief on consumers; (4) the effect of import relief on U.S. 
international economic interests; (5) the geographic concentration of imported products; (6) 
the extent to which the U.S. is a focal point for exports of such articles; and (7) any economic 
and social costs to taxpayers, communities and workers. 
65. See Receipt of Ford Motor Co. Petition, 45 Fed. Reg. 55, 873 (1980). 
66. See Determination of No Serious Injury, 45 Fed. Reg. 85, 194 (1980). 
67. /d. 
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granting import relief,68 the Commission noted that oil prices, the economic 
recession and the shift in consumer demand to smaller, more fuel-efficient cars 
were the principal reasons for the industry's decline.69 As ITC Commissioner 
Paula Stern, who voted against import relief, observed, an import quota would 
merely be "relief directed at one of the symptoms rather than at the cause of [our 
industry's] problems."7o 
The failure of the escape clause proceeding to facilitate import relief on behalf 
of the auto industry has forced U.S. auto makers to seek relief from alternative 
sources.71 Accordingly, the U.S. government resorted to a voluntary quota as the 
most effective means of providing assistance to the domestic automobile indus-
try.72 
III. VOLUNTARY CONTROLS AND GATT 
The U.S. International Trade Commission decision denying import relief 
afforded the United States only a limited set of options in dealing with Japanese 
car imports. 73 The U.S. preference for the voluntary quota approach over 
legislative action arose from a reluctance to contravene open-market principles 
of international trade. 74 U.S. participation in GATT illustrates the U.S. com-
mitment to a policy of free trade. 75 GATT, an international organization with a 
membership of eighty-five countries,76 provides the main framework for pro-
moting international trade.77 Members of GATT pledge to reduce both tariff and 
68. [d. The ITC vote split along party lines, with two Republicans voting in favor of imposing trade 
barriers on imports and two Democrats voting against.Id. The swing vote was cast by an independent, 
Commissioner Michael Calhoun. who acknowledged that the U.S. auto industry was suffering serious 
injury, but said that imports were not the biggest factor. [d. 
69. [d. See generally E. TODER, TRADE POLICY AND THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (1978). 
70. Hearings, (pI. I I), supra note 3, at 114 (emphasis added). 
71. [d. The U.S. automobile industry tried its case in the legislative arena. Schlosser, supra note 41, at 
3. Beginning in February 1980, Congress introduced a number of auto trade bills. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 
598, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONGo REc. Hll, 560-562 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1980). This bill dealt with 
mandatory quotas and executive negotiating authority to impose such limits. [d. Unlike the 1980 
Congress, in which the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee took the lead on the auto issue, the 
Senate Finance Committee played an activist role in 1981. Schlosser,supra note 41, at 3. SenatorsJohn 
Danforth (R.-Mo.) and Lloyd Bentsen (D.-Tex.) were the principal sponsors of Senate Bill 396, which 
would limit auto imports from Japan to 1.6 million units annually for 1981, 1982 and 1983. Hearings, 
(pI. II), supra note 3, at 3-4. Ford Motor, ill. at 170, Chrysler, id. at 225, and General Motors, ill. at 240, 
participated in the congressional hearings on the proposed quota bill. 
72. Hearings, (pI. II), supra note 3, at 78 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce). 
MacKnight, The Auto Pact, JAPAN INSIGHT, May 8, 1981, at 2-3. 
73. Schlosser, supra note 41, at 3. 
74. See generally HUDEC, supra note 6, at 213. 
75. See U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note I, at viii. The U.S. was most recently involved 
in the promotion of free trade with its participation in the 1979 Tokyo Round Negotiations to reduce 
trade barriers. See generally GATT ACTIVITIES, supra note 7. 
76. GATT ACTIVITIES, supra note 7, at 86. 
77. U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note I, at viii. GATT, in U.S. law, is an executive 
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nontariff barriers on a worldwide basis and to eliminate discriminatory treat-
ment in international commerce. 78 GATT rules do not readily permit the impo-
sition of unilateral import controls to regulate foreign commerce. 79 Hence, 
Congress would find difficulty enacting quota legislation which would unilater-
ally limit Japanese auto imports without violating U.S. international trade com-
mitments under GATT. 
A legislated quota, such as the one proposed in 1981 by Senate Bill 396,80 to 
restrict Japanese auto imports may violate several articles of GATT. Article I( 1) 
of GATT enunciates the most-favored-nation principle. It provides: 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on 
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the 
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with 
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with 
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation 
and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in para-
graphs 2 and 4 of Article Ill, any advantage, favor, privilege or immu-
nity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties. 81 
A unilateral quota aimed solely at the Japanese car market would restrict imports 
from only one contracting member of GATT -Japan.82 The quota would 
thereby put the imports of every other nation at an advantage because these 
imports would not be subject to quota limits.83 Under Article 1(1), an "advantage, 
favor, privilege or immunity" must extend to all contracting parties.84 By only 
limiting Japanese imports, a unilateral quota would exclude Japan from the 
privilege afforded other foreign auto producers, who may export automobiles to 
the United States without restrictions. Since the imports of all other contracting 
parties would have an advantage over the Japanese auto imports, such a unilat-
eral quota would violate Article I( 1). Th us the proposed quota would contravene 
agreement that Congress has never ratified. Jackson, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United 
States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 250 (1967). An executive agreement means that the United States 
entered into an agreement not by congressional ratification but by the presidential authority under the 
Constitution and as delegated by Congress. [d. 
78. Cuddington & McKinnon, Free Trade Versus Protectionism: A Perspective, in TARIFFS, QUOTAS AND 
TRADE: THE POLITICS OF PROTECTIONISM 21 (1979). 
79. GATT, supra note 6, art. XI. 
80. Hearings, (pt. II), supra note 3, at 3-4. 
81. GATT, supra note 6, art. 1(1) (emphasis added). 
82. See GATT ACTIVITIES, supra note 7, at 86. 
83. Hearings, (pt. II), supra note 3, at 116 (statement of Robert M. McElwaine, President of the 
American International Automobile Dealers Association). 
84. See note 81 and accompanying text supra. 
1982] REGULATING JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE IMPORTS 441 
this provision's guarantee of non-discriminatory trade between GATT's member 
countries.85 
Article XI(l) would present a second problem with quota legislation. This 
Article, which prohibits quantitative restrictions on both imports and exports,86 
provides: 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other 
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export 
licenses, or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any 
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory 
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for 
export of any product destined for the territory of any other con-
tracting party. 87 
However, this general provISIon has several important exceptions.88 Article 
XI(l) applies subject to several rights of members.89 These rights include the 
imposition of import restraints: (1) to control imports interfering with domestic 
agricultural programs designed to limit production in order to prevent oversup-
ply;90 (2) to safeguard the external financial position and the balance-of-
payments of a contracting party;91 (3) to allow a contracting party in specified 
situations to abide by its obligations under international commodity agreements 
that have been submitted to, and not disapproved by, the contracting parties;92 
and (4) to implement "any action which [a contracting party] considers necessary 
for its essential security interests . . . in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations."93 
The only exemption from Article XI(l) which on its face would likely apply to 
the auto trade issue is the second exception.94 If this exception were applicable to 
the auto import problem, Article XII(2) would require the United States to limit 
85. Hearings, (pt. II), supra note 3, at 116 (statement of Robert M. McElwaine, President of the 
American International Automobile Dealers Association). See JACKSON, supra note 9, at 255. 
86. GATT, supra note 6, art. XI(l). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. arts. XI(2), XII, XX(h), XXI(b)(iii). 
89. /d. 
90. Id. art. XI(2). 
91. Id. art. XII. 
92. Id. art. XX(h). 
93. Id. art. XXI(b)(iii). 
94. Hearings, (pt. II), supra note 3, at 116 (statement of Robert M. McElwaine, President of the 
American International Automobile Dealers Association). The first and third exceptions, which apply to 
domestic agricultural programs and international commodity agreements respectively, would not apply 
to the auto trade problem because of the specific nature of these provisions. GATT, sup,a note 6, arts. 
XI(2), XX(h). Similarly, the fourth exception would not apply since the auto trade issue would probably 
not rise to the level of "an emergency in international relations." Id. art. XXI(b)(iii). The ITC denial of 
import relief to the auto industry demonstrates the fact that even under U.S. procedures the industry 
failed to qualify as in an emergency situation. See § II.B supra. See also Smith, supra note I, at 27. 
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a unilateral import quota to the minimum level necessary to remedy the situa-
tion95 and to release the import controls as soon as conditions would permit.96 
Although these requirements are not necessarily egregious, they do present a 
third obstacle to the application of import controls. Even if quantitative restric-
tions on auto imports are permissible pursuant to this exception, Article XIII(l) 
of GATp7 states that a contracting party may not apply these restrictions against 
imports fron anyone nation without applying restrictions on such imports to all 
nations.98 A unilateral quota would restrict auto imports from Japan alone while 
allowing auto producers from other nations to export vehicles without restraint. 
Article I1I(l) requires that restrictions apply equally to imports from all nations. 
Since restrictions would apply solely to Japanese imports, the proposed unilat-
eral quota would violate this provision.99 
The limited application of the exceptions to Article XI may lead to reliance by 
contracting parties on Article XIX for validation of import quotas. IOO Under 
Article XIX of GATT, import limitations "may be imposed only where products 
are being imported ... in such increased quantities and under such conditions 
as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers ... of like or 
directly competitive products."lol The United States requires that an injured 
party seeking import restraints under GATT obtain an affirmative finding of 
import-related injuryl02 from the U.S. International Trade Commission in order 
to avoid needlessly invoking Article XIX of GATT.103 In the case of the U.S. 
auto industry, the ITC has made a negative injury determination. lo4 The ITC 
based its decision on the fact that oil prices, the economic recession and the 
demand for smaller cars among consumers were the primary reasons for the 
industry's situation. lo5 Similarly, an international dispute-settlement panel 
95. GATT, supra note 6, art. XII(2)(a). See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 684. 
96. GATT, supra note 6, art. XII(2)(b). See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 685. 
97. GATT, supra note 6, art. XIII(I). 
98. [d. 
99. Hearings, (pt. II), supra note 3, at 117 (statement of Robert M. McElwaine, President of the 
American International Automobile Dealers Association). 
100. GATT, supra note 6, art. XIX. The parties to GATT refer to Article XIX of GATT as the 
"safeguard" system of GATT since Article XIX permits import restrictions in order to enable domestic 
industries to adjust to growing competition from foreign industries. See Note, GATT and the Tokyo 
Round, II CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 302, 320 (1981). Article XIX has standards of assessing import:related 
injury similarto those previously noted in § 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. S. REp. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess. 119, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7186, 7263. 
101. GATT, supra note 6, art. XIX. 
102. S. REp. No. 1298, 93d Con g., 2d Sess. 122, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7186, 
7266. 
103. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 190 (statement of Robert M. McElwaine, President of the 
American International Automobile Dealers Association). Throughout the 33 years of GATT's opera-
tion, the U.S. has invoked the principle in Article XIX by requiring that petitioners obtain an affirma-
tive finding from the ITC. [d. 
104. See § II.B supra. 
105. [d. 
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would likely find insufficient evidence that the influx of Japanese auto imports 
"cause[s] or threaten[s] serious injury" and thereby determine the quota 
legislation to be in violation of Article XIX.106 
The only alternative for qualifying quota legislation under GATT rules is the 
waiver provision of Article XXV. Article XXV(5) provides that "in exceptional 
circumstances, the contracting parties may waive an obligation imposed upon a 
contracting party by this Agreement; ... any such decision shall be approved by 
a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more 
than half of the contracting parties."107 Absent a waiver under Article XXV of 
GATT, quota legislation would have violated U.S. international trade obligations 
under GATT.10S A GATT violation invites further retaliation by Japan: "At any 
time that [the United States uses] legislative force or other unilateral type of 
action to impair trade, there is a right, under the [articles of GATT] for the other 
[exporting] countries to take equivalent action against U.S. goods."109 However, 
japan's ability to establish grounds for retaliation against the United States 
under the provisions of GATT is unlikely. The United States, whose market 
accounts for thirty percent of Japanese exports, is japan's largest trading part-
ner.110 Japan had a twelve billion dollar trade surplus with the United States in 
1980111 and an eighteen billion dollar trade surplus in 1981.112 A rise in unem-
ployment levels might be grounds for retaliation under GATT. Nevertheless, 
import controls probably would not increase japan's 1.9 percent unemployment 
rate since overtime work produces an estimated 1.5 million Japanese vehicles.113 
These figures suggest that Japan could accommodate the limits proposed in 
quota legislation by merely cutting back on overtime productionY4 Therefore, 
any claim by Japan as an injured party seeking retaliation under GATT would be 
unfounded. 
The risk of a GATT violation and the threat of Japanese retaliation might 
compel the United States to refrain from adopting a unilateral quota positionY5 
GATT's limitations on the availability of unilateral quotas, as authorized in 
106. Hearings, (pt. II). supra note 3. at 117 (statement of Robert M. McElwaine. President of the 
American International Automobile Dealers Association). 
107. GATT. supra note 6. art. XXV(5). 
108. ld. Hearings. (pt. II). supra note 3. at 118 (statement of Robert M. McElwaine. President of the 
American International Automobile Dealers Association). 
109. Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals BeJore the House Comm. on Ways and Means. 9 1st Cong .• 2d 
Sess. 455 (1970) (statement of Maurice Stans. former Secretary of Commerce). 
110. Hearings. (pt. II). supra note 3. at 86 (statement of Paul J. Fannin. former U.S. Senator). 
111. Boston Globe. Mar. 19. 1982. at 11. col. 2. 
112. /d. 
113. Hearings and Markup. supra note 43. at 57 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser. President of the 
United Auto Workers (UA W». 
114. Hearings. (pt. II). supra note 3. at 203 (statistic of the U.S. Department of Transportation). 
115. Hearings, (pt. I). supra note 3. at 50 (statement of Ambassador Robert D. Hormats. former U.S. 
Trade Representative). See HUDEC. supra note 7. at 213. 
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Articles XI and XIX,1I6 might influence Congress to decide not to pass quota 
legislation. Absent a sufficient finding of import-related injury pursuant to U.S. 
procedures under the Trade Act of 1974117 and the international standards of 
injury under GATT,llB the imposition of a quota designed to provide import 
relief may have adverse trade policy implicationsY9 U.S. implementation of a 
quota would not only override the Section 201 proceeding, which denied import 
relief to the U.S. auto industry due to an insufficient showing of serious in-
jury,120 but would also contradict the U.S. commitment to GATT's guidelines 
which similarly require an affirmative finding of injury before granting import 
relief.121 Thus, quota legislation would undermine the ITC decision and circum-
vent the articles of GATT.122 In choosing not to pass quota legislation, the 
United States has avoided the consequences which a violation of GATT might 
bring as well as the potential international ill will which nations might associate 
with the imposition of import controls. 
IV. THE ApPLICATION OF THE VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT AGREEMENT 
A. Executive Authority to Negotiate a Voluntary Restraint Agreement 
The Reagan Administration's preference for the voluntary quota system arises 
from its desire to adhere to the U.S. position as a proponent of free trade and 
signatory to GATT.123 A unilateral quota would not comply with various articles 
of GATT.124 Moreover, a voluntary quota has an economic advantage over 
unilateral import controls from Japan's standpoint.125 Under a voluntary system, 
in which quota levels are not fixed, Japanese producers retain some control in 
establishing the terms of the agreement126 and in raising quota levels according 
to market demands.127 Despite the seemingly overwhelming preference for a 
voluntary restraint agreement over a unilateral quota,12B the United States must 
resolve a threshold issue before adopting a voluntary restraint agreement: This 
116. See text accompanying notes 86-106 supra. 
117. Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1980). 
118. GATT, supra note 6, art. XIX. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 555. 
119. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 191. 
120. See § II.B supra. 
121. GATT, supra note 6, art. XIX. 
122. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 191. 
123. N.Y. Times, May I, 1981, at D2, col. 4. 
124. See § III supra. 
125. Japan Times Weekly, May 9, 1981, at 9, col. I. 
126. See HUNSBERGER, supra note 4, at 355. Although voluntary quotas are often agreed upon under 
pressure, the exporting nation has a chance to negotiate and the result includes some element of 
compromise. [d. 
127. Japan Times Weekly, May 9, 1981, at 2, col. 4. Under a voluntary restraint agreement, Japan 
can possibly acquire a larger share of the market during the second year of the quota. /d. 
128. N.Y. Times, May I, 1981, at I, col. 3. 
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question is the extent of the executive authority to negotiate voluntary auto 
restraints with Japan. 
1. Explicitly Delegated Authority 
The U.S. Constitution vests in Congress the power to "regulate commerce with 
foreign nations and among the several states."129 In various legislative provi-
sions, Congress has delegated this responsibility and specifically authorized the 
President to negotiate and implement voluntary restraint agreements.130 
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to provide 
import relief by way of import restrictions or adjustment assistance.131 This 
Section only applies after an "escape clause" hearing 132 and a finding by the U.S. 
International Trade Commission that imports constitute a "substantial cause of 
serious injury"133 to domestic producers of similar or directly competitive com-
modities.134 The Commission's ruling in the auto case denied import relief 
pursuant to Section 201 of the Trade Act.13s In light of the negative ITC 
decision, the general negotiating authority which Section 201 grants to the 
President would not be available in the auto trade case.136 Section 201 requires a 
finding of import-related injury by the ITC before the President may invoke his 
powers to negotiate. 137 
The executive authority provided in Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 is 
narrow in comparison to the wide discretion granted by Section 204 of the 
Agricultural Act of 1956138 and Section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act 
of 1917.139 Congress enacted the Agricultural Act to remove any doubts about 
the President's power to conduct negotiations with Japan regarding cotton 
textiles.14o Having been granted adequate authority to negotiate trade restraints, 
the executive branch entered into discussions with Japan which eventually re-
sulted in the implementation of voluntary quotas on Japanese cotton textiles. 141 
129. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
130. Trade Act of 1974 § 203,19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1980). Agricultural Act of 1956 § 204, 7 U.S.C. § 
1854 (1968). Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 grant 
the President authority to negotiate and implement voluntary restraint agreements. See text accom-
panying notes 131-41 infra. 
131. Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1980). 
132. [d. For a discussion of the escape clause, see § n.B supra. 
133. Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1980). 
134. [d. 
135. See text accompanying notes 65-70 supra. 
136. Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1980). 
137. [d. 
138. Agricultural Act of 1956 § 204, 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1968). 
139. 50 u.S.C. app. §§ 1-40 (1980). 
140.7 u.S.C. § 1854 (1968). 
141. HUNSBERGER, supra note 5, at 353. In the case of cotton textiles, the parties did not exhaust their 
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Similarly, Section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 granted the 
Executive the discretion to negotiate import controls in situations of national 
emergency.142 
The failure of the "escape clause" hearing to facilitate protective action on 
behalf of the domestic auto industry led U.S. auto representatives to seek 
congressional legislation which would delineate the President's authority to pro-
ceed in negotiations with Japan.143 In the fall of 1980, Congress came close to 
adopting a provision similar to the Agricultural Act of 1956}44 Although the 
joint resolution 145 cleared the House of Representatives by a 317 to 57 margin, it 
died in the Senate}46 Absent legislatively delegated authority which would 
clarify the President's power to negotiate a voluntary restraint agreement for 
auto imports with Japan,147 the executive branch must rely on its inherent 
constitutional power to conduct foreign affairs148 for its negotiating authority. 
2. Inherent Constitutional Power 
The Supreme Court broadly described the constitutional power of the Presi-
dent to conduct foreign affairs149 in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corpora-
tion 150: "In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and 
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
representative of the nation."151 While the language appears to refer primarily 
to the executive branch in its dealings with foreign sovereigns, the President may 
negotiate with other non-governmental foreign parties as an incident of this 
power.152 
Approval by a court of a presidential exercise of inherent constitutional 
authority to negotiate a voluntary restraint agreement most recently appeared in 
remedies under the Tariff Commission as no hearings were held on the matter. Id. See 7 U.S.C. § 1854 
(1968). 
142. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-40 (1980). 
143. H.R.J. Res. 598. 96th Cong .• 2d Sess .• 126 CONGo REc. HI!. 560-562 (daily ed. Dec. 2. 1980). 
The principal sponsors of the bill were Representatives William Brodhead (D.-Mich.). Donald Albosta 
(D.-Mich.) and John Brademus (D.-Ind.). Id. 
144. Schlosser. supra note 41. at 3. 
145. H.R.J. Res. 598. 96th Cong .• 2d Sess. 126 CONGo REC. HII. 560-562 (daily ed. Dec. 2. 1980). 
146. Schlosser. The Auto Trade Dispute. J.E.!. REP .• Jan. 9. 1981. at 2. 
147. Id. 
148. U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2. 
149. Consumers Union of U.S .• Inc. v. Rogers. 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973). modified and aff'd 
sub. nom. Consumers Union V. Kissinger. 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974). cerl. denied. 421 U.S. 1004 
(1975). 
150. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
151. !d. at 319. 
152. Comment. Executive Authority and Antitrust Considerations in "Voluntary" Limits on Steel Imports. 118 
U. PA. L. REv. 105. 126 (1969). 
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Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers. 153 The case involved the steel import 
quota in 1969.154 After negotiations with the U.S. State Department, steel man-
ufacturers from Japan and the European Economic Community (EEC)155 
agreed to voluntarily restrain steel exports from 1969 through 1971.156 An 
extension of the three-year arrangement in 1972 led to an action by Consumers 
Union, a public interest group, 157 which raised the issue of presidential authority 
to negotiate these voluntary restraint agreements.158 The court held that al-
though Congress has not legislated the negotiating power, this power is an 
extension of the executive power to conduct foreign policy under the Constitu-
tion.159 This holding supports the conclusion that the executive branch has 
sufficient authority under the Constitution to negotiate a voluntary restraint 
agreement with Japan without legislative assistance. 16o 
B. Antitrust Implications of Negotiating a Voluntary Restraint Agreement 
To the extent that it controls the inft ux of foreign imports, the voluntary auto 
agreement between the United States and Japan is "in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, [and] with foreign nations"161 and may be 
illegal within the meaning of Section One of the Sherman Act. 162 The negotia-
tion of a voluntary restraint agreement can assume one of three basic forms: 
industry-to-industry, government-to-industry, and government-to-govern-
ment. 163 Each of the three negotiating procedures in the voluntary restraint 
153. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 142·43. 
154. /d. 
155. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. II (1958) [hereinafter 
cited as EEC Treaty]. Member countries are Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany), France, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Republic of Ireland. E. 
NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER: THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 3 (1979). The primary 
aim of the EEC is the eventual economic union of its member nations, ultimately leading to political 
union. EEC Treaty,supra, art. 2. Steps in this direction include the gradual elimination of internal tariff 
barriers and the establishment of a common tariff system, the free movement of labor and capital and 
the abolition of trusts and cartels. [d. arts. 85-86. 
156. Bates, supra note 21, at 101. 
157. [d. at 102. 
158. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 140. Assuming such executive authority existed, Consumers Union 
also raised the issue of the agreements' function as a "restraint of trade" pursuant to § 1 of the Sherman 
Act. [d. at 136. This claim was dropped before a judicial determination of the issue. [d. 
159. /d. at 142-43. 
160. [d. 
161. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973). 
162. [d. 
163. Smith, supra note 1, at 16-22. Two other approaches to negotiations are individual-to-exporting 
industry and multilateral agreements. [d. at 18, 21. Resort to either of these procedures is uncommon. 
[d. The only case of an individual playing a major role in trade negotiations on behalf of the U.S. 
government was in 1971. [d. at 18. Congressman Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee and supporter of a bill to impose textile import quotas, negotiated a voluntary restraint 
agreement with the Japanese textile industry. /d. at 18. Similarly, multilateral agreements rarely occur 
in light of the provisions of GATT. [d. at 21. 
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context raises antitrust issues under the Sherman Act. In addition, each method 
involves different types of parties and, consequently, has varying potential for 
antitrust liability. An examination of these various negotiating procedures sheds 
light on the defenses which are available to lessen the risk of a violation under U.S. 
antitrust law. 
1. Industry-to-Industry Negotiations 
In industry-to-industry negotiations, producers in the exporting and import-
ing nations directly conduct the negotiations.164 Although other countries have 
utilized this approach effectively,l6S voluntary restraint agreements among U.S. 
and foreign producers run a substantial risk of violating U.S. antitrust law.166 
The most potent legal objection to negotiations at this level arises under the 
Sherman Act, which expressly forbids anti-competitive, private interest agree-
ments.167 The court in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 168 held that 
agreements reached through industry-to-industry negotiations, which substan-
tially affect U.S. commerce, likely fall within the ambit of the Sherman Act. 169 
2. Government-to-Industry Negotiations 
A second arrangement which can result in a voluntary restraint agreement is 
government-to-industry negotiations. In this arrangement, a government repre-
sents the interests of private industry in dealing with foreign producers. I 70 A 
typical example of a government-to-industry agreement is the 1969 and 1972 
steel import arrangements.171 In these two arrangements the U.S. government 
proceeded to negotiate with foreign producers on behalf of the domestic steel 
industry.172 Consumers Union challenged the VRA on imports of steel.173 The 
issue in Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers I 74 was whether private agreements, 
164. Id. at 16. This approach requires (a) the existence of a strictly regulated industry in the 
exporting nation that monopolizes the exports of the product and recognizes some advantage in 
controlling its output in a given situation and (b) the negotiating strength of the industry in the 
importing nation, which must be able to offer either a quid pro quo or the threat of effective retaliation. 
!d. 
165. !d. For example, Great Britain implemented company-to-company arrangements regarding the 
auto problem. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 51 (statement of Ambassador Robert D. Hormats, former 
U.S. Trade Representative). 
166. !d. 
167. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (1973). Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,4-5 
(1958). 
168. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
169. !d. 
170. Smith, supra note I, at 17. 
171. Bates, supra note 21, at 101. 
172. !d. 
173. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 136. 
174.Id. 
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negotiated or induced by the U.S. government but falling short of outright 
governmental compulsion, enjoy at least some protection from antitrust attack 
because of the direct involvement of governmental officials in these negotia-
tions. 175 
The defenses in the cases of Eastern Railroad Presidents-Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc. 176 and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington l77 purported to 
grant private parties immunity from antitrust charges where a restraint upon 
trade or a monopolization was the result of valid governmental action, whether 
legislative or administrative. However, the Court in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co. 178 held that mere participation by officials of the executive branch 
in the negotiation of agreements in restraint of trade did not mitigate the 
illegality of such arrangements under the Sherman ACt. 179 Although the execu-
tive branch has inherent constitutional authority under its foreign affairs power 
to negotiate voluntary restraint agreements,180 the scope of its authority does not 
extend to the enforcement of the agreements.181 Absent legislation specifically 
authorizing the President to enforce the agreement, the President is unable to 
enforce a VRA domestically.182 Since the government lacks the power to enforce 
the agreement, the collusive conduct of domestic and foreign parties acting in 
accordance with the voluntary restraint agreement poses a serious antitrust 
problem. 183 Actions by private industry to curtail exports have a substantial 
effect on U.S. commerce. Because this effect can be detrimental to trade, Con-
gress enacted the Sherman Act. Thus, application of the Act to these situations is 
within the purpose of the Sherman Act. 184 
In order to forestall liability of domestic and foreign steel producers, Congress 
enacted Section 607 of the Trade Act of 1974.185 This section provides that no 
175. U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note I, at 185. 
176. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The case was an action for an injunction and treble damages brought by 
several trucking companies against a group of railroad companies, which allegedly campaigned for laws 
harmful to truckers. [d. The Court held that an association which "persuades the legislature or the 
executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or monopoly" 
must also be exempt. [d. at 136. 
177. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). In this case a union welfare and retirement fund sued a small coal company 
for royalty payments under a wage agreement. [d. The company filed a cross claim against the union 
alleging various antitrust violations. Id. The Court held that "efforts to influence public officials do not 
violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, 
either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act." [d. at 670. 
178. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
179. Id. at 225-227. 
180. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 140. See § IV.A supra. 
181. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 156 (official letter from Assistant Attorney General John H. 
Shenefield, spokesman for the U.S. Department of Justice). 
182. Id. at 19. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 142. 
183. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 156 (official letter from Assistant Attorney General John H. 
Shenefield, spokesman for the U.S. Department of Justice). 
184. Id. 
185. Trade Act of 1974 § 607, 19 U.S.C. § 2485 (1980). 
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person associated with the voluntary steel arrangement should be liable for 
damages, penalties or other sanctions under U.S. antitrust law. 1s6 However, 
absent a clear antitrust exemption granted by Congress, the U.S. government's 
role in government-to-industry negotiations will not serve to insulate private 
parties who particiate in subsequent voluntary restraint agreements from Sher-
man Act liability.187 Since the executive branch lacks the authority to enforce 
such agreements, private parties, acting without governmental compulsion to 
meet the terms of the VRAS, would bear the risk of an antitrust violation. ISS 
3. Government-to-Government Negotiations 
The third type of negotiations takes place on a government-to-government 
level. The U.S.-Japanese auto accord utilized this negotiating procedure. 189 In 
government-to-government negotiations, the governments of both the import-
ing and exporting nations conduct negotiations on behalf of domestic indus-
tries. 190 This third type of agreement contrasts with both the industry-to-
industry and government-to-industry agreements. These latter agreements are 
unilateral undertakings by the export industries and theoretically do not involve 
their governments. 191 Since the exporting nation's government cannot enforce 
the agreement, industries participating in these arrangements are subject to 
antitrust charges under the Sherman ACt. 192 On the other hand, a voluntary 
restraint agreement reached through bilateral negotiations invokes the full 
power of the government of the exporting nation to secure enforcement. 193 
The manner in which a foreign government implements a voluntary restraint 
agreement has implications as to its potential antitrust liability. For example, if a 
foreign government merely makes a recommendation or expresses approval of 
the agreement, foreign producers may incur antitrust charges if they voluntarily 
limit their exports to the U.S. market. 194 Regardless of the foreign government's 
recommendation or approval of the VRA, the exporters' actions would consti-
tute a Sherman Act violation as a "restraint or trade."195 However, if the foreign 
186. S. REp. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7186, 
7360. 
187. See Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 140-42. 
188. U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note I, at 185. 
189. Japan Economic Journal, May 5, 1981, at I, col. I. 
190. Smith, supra note I, at 19. 
191. /d. 
192. /d. 
193. [d. 
194. Continental Ore CO. V. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). United States v. 
Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). 
195. Continental Ore Co v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). As a matter of 
international comity and fairness, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws is a subject about 
which there has been a great deal of discussion. Kinter & Hallgarten, Application of United States Antitrust 
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government officially enforces the voluntary restraint agreement, foreign pro-
ducers may escape antitrust liability.196 
Two antitrust defenses are available when a government enforces voluntary 
restraint agreements: "foreign compulsion"197 and the "act of state" doctrine. 19B 
"Foreign compubion" applies when a foreign government compels private par-
ties located within its borders to comply with inter-governmental agreements.199 
The court in Interamerican Refining Corporation v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc. 20o held 
that trade practices arising from "foreign compulsion" would most likely not be 
subject to Sherman Act liability.201 The court reasoned that the Sherman Act 
does not confer jurisdiction on United States courts over acts of business which a 
nation compels.202 In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation, 203 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is unlikely to allow the "foreign compulsion" 
defense absent a valid decree by a foreign government compelling compliance 
with the inter-governmental agreement.204 The case involved a corporation 
appointed by the Canadian government to act as the nation's exclusive metal 
controller, responsible for allocating strategic metals for Canadian industries 
during World War 11.205 Although acting within its discretionary authority, the 
Canadian agent engaged in purchasing practices which discriminated against the 
plaintiff-U.S. competitor. 206 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the defense that 
an export restriction pursuant to governmental recommendation or request was 
exempt from antitrust liability.207 In its decision, the Court emphasized that the 
Canadian purchasing agent's anti-competitive activities had not been specifically 
Laws to F<ffeign Trade and Commerce, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 343, 356-58 (1973). Actual litigation 
reveals that jurisdiction is not lacking. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAws 498 
(2d ed. 1973). Up to May 1973, the U.S. Department of Justice had filed approximately 248 foreign 
trade antitrust cases; not one of these cases was lost for lack of jurisdiction over the activities which 
allegedly violated the law. [d. See generally J. ATWOOD & V. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN 
BUSINESS ABROAD (1981). 
196. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
197. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). 
198. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 
(1918); F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (1966), affd, 375 F. 2d 1011 (2d Cir. 
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967). 
199. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).But 
see Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977), where the court held that 
"foreign compulsion" was no defense for acts committed in the United States. 
200. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). 
201. [d. at 1303. 
202. Id. 
203. 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
204. Id. 
205. [d. at 707. 
206. !d. at 695. 
207. !d. at 704. To the disadvantage of the plaintiff, the Canadian purchasing agent assisted its U.S. 
parent company by restraining and monopolizing the vanadium industry. [d. 
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directed by the Canadian government. 208 Mere governmental request, acquies-
cence or approval is, therefore, insufficient grounds for claiming the "foreign 
compulsion" defense.209 
On the other hand, if a government participates in implementing an agree-
ment to the extent that the action of the private parties are tantamount to those 
of the sovereign, antitrust liability will not attach because of the "act of state" 
doctrine .210 The "act of state" doctrine precludes U.S. courts from inquiring into 
the validity of governmental acts of a recognized foreign sovereign committed 
within its own territory.211 Underhill v. Hemandez 212 sets forth the traditional 
formulation of the "act of state" doctrine: 
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every 
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in 
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its 
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be 
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign 
powers as between themselves.213 
However, the "act of state" defense is limited in the voluntary restraint agree-
ment context. 214 The Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of 
Cuba 215 distinguishes between public and governmental acts of sovereign states 
and private and commercial acts: "When a state enters the marketplace, it divests 
itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader."216 
Because the case involved an act which is commercial and not public in nature, 
the Court held that the "act of state" doctrine would not apply.217 Thus, most 
private actions and the commercial actions of state-owned and operated trading 
companies do not qualify as "acts of state."218 
Unless the defenses of "foreign compulsion" or "act of state" apply, any 
collusive private conduct abroad pursuant to a voluntary restraint agreement 
208. [d. at 707. 
209. [d. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). Timberlane was a 
private antitrust suit in which the court found potential liability for restraints of U.S. import trade 
occurring in Central America. [d. 
210. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
211. [d. 
212. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
213. !d. at 252. 
214. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). 
215. !d. 
216. !d. at 696 (quoting Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934». 
217. !d. at 697. 
218. !d. "Because the act relied on by respondents in this case was an act arising out of the conduct by 
Cuba's agents in the operation of cigar businesses for profit, the act was not an act of state." [d. at 706. 
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would run the risk of an antitrust violation.219 Governmental recommendation 
or request by the exporting nation is insufficient in minimizing the antitrust 
c1aim.220 In order to avoid antitrust challenges, parties to the agreement should 
obtain the direct, articulated commitment of the exporting government to 
enforce the VRA, rather than rely on informal governmental encouragement or 
the discretion of private industry.221 Under these limited circumstances, foreign 
producers complying with their government's directives may avert U.S. antitrust 
liability. 
C. japanese Administration of the Quota 
A key factor in evaluating the antitrust implications of Japanese auto export 
restraints is how the Japanese government implements the quota. As expressed 
by the U.S. Justice Department, "an agreement between the two governments-
Japan and the United States - reached as a result of such [bilateral] negotiations 
would not be an antitrust violation ... if the foreign government required 
through its legal process compliance by its national firms."222 The primary 
branch of the Japanese government empowered to enforce the VRA on auto-
mobiles is the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. (MITI).223 As 
reported in Japan's initial announcement ofthe agreement,224 MITI is responsi-
ble for setting quotas for individual automakers under administrative guidance 
and for requiring them to report their U.S. car exports each month.225 In 
addition to monitoring the volume of exports, MITI will impose mandatory 
curbs under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Control 
Law)226 if car shipments reach the assigned quota levels.227 In order to avoid an 
antitrust violation,228 the imposition of an export quota must qualify as a legiti-
mate exercise of MITI's administrative and statutory power within the Japanese 
governmental system.229 
219. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
220. !d. 
221. !d. 
222. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 156 (official letter from Assistant Attorney General John H. 
Shenefield, spokesman for the U.S. Department of Justice). 
223. Japan Times Weekly, May 9, 1981, at 2, col. I. 
224. N.Y. Times, May I, 1981, at I, col. 3. 
225. Japan Times Weekly, May 9, 1981, at 2, col. 4. 
226. Law No. 228 of 1949 (amended 1968) [hereinafter cited as Law No. 228]. The Control Law is 
the means for regulating exports from Japan. [d. arts. 48-51. 
227. Japan Times Weekly, May 9, 1981, at 2, col. 4. 
228. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 156 (official letter from Assistant Attorney General John H. 
Shenefield, spokesman for the U. S. Department of Justice). 
229. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970); 
Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3. 
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1. The Role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry is the single most important 
institution in Japan's industrial policy-making process.230 The Japanese govern-
ment formed MITI in 1949 by combining the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry and the Board of Trade.231 MITI includes all but a few major indus-
tries within its jurisdiction,232 and is notable for the variety of functions it 
performs. MITI is responsible for: (I) shaping the structure of industry and 
adjusting dislocations that arise in transition; (2) guiding the healthy develop-
ment of industries and their production and distribution activities; (3) managing 
Japan's foreign trade and its commercial relations; (4) ensuring adequate raw 
materials and energy flows to industry; and (5) managing particular areas such as 
small business patents and industrial technology.233 
MITI is also responsible for administering export controls, such as the volun-
tary automobile quota.234 Under the Law Establishing the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry,235 MITI has the authority to take certain administra-
tive measures to implement Japanese trade policy.236 In addition to the power 
granted by its own enabling statute, MITI assumes its authority from the broad 
statutory mandate of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law,237 
and the Export and Import Transactions Law. 238 Thus, as a result of the 
Japanese statutory scheme, MITI is an effective arm of the Japanese govern-
ment in industrial and international trade matters.239 
2. Administrative Guidance 
In enforcing the voluntary auto quota with the United States, MITI has 
chosen to use administrative guidance, supported by its official statutory and 
legal authority under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.240 
Much of the leverage MITI and other agencies exert over industry in Japan 
results from the pervasive Japanese practice of administrative guidance. 241 Ad-
230. MAGAZ1NER & HOUT, supra note 16, at 39. 
231. [d. 
232. [d. 
233. [d. at 40. 
234. HUNSBERGER, supra note 4, at 291. 
235. Law No. 275 of 1952 (amended 1977). 
236. [d. art. 4(1). Administrative measures include the restriction or prohibition of the export or 
import of goods; the execution of agreements regarding international trade; the sanctioning of such 
agreements by exporters, importers, or manufacturers. [d. 
237. Law No. 228, supra note 226, arts. 47-48. See § IV.C.3 infra. 
238. Law No. 299 of 1952 (amended 1965). 
239. See MAGAZ1NER & HOUT, supra note 16, at 39-41. 
240. Japan Times Weekly, May 9, 1981, at 2, col. 4. 
241. MAGAZ1NER & HOUT, supra note 16, at 41. See also J. STOCKWIN, JAPAN: DIVIDED POLITICS IN A 
GROWTH ECONOMY (1975). 
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mmlstrative guidance occurs when government officials direct industries and 
firms to achieve certain policy objectives.242 This approach reflects, in part, the 
Japanese preference for avoiding confrontation by using informal channels 
rather than legislative action to deal with problems. 243 Despite the informality of 
administrative guidance, the Japanese government has traditionally relied on 
this method for solving trade problems. 244 
Administrative guidance technically involves "influence, advice, and persua-
sion to cause firms or individuals to behave in particular ways."245 Ministerial 
officials outline the government's wishes and expectations to representatives of a 
firm, an industry, or an industrial association. 246 Technically, compliance is 
voluntary, but government officials use their designated powers to "provide or 
withhold loans, grants, subsidies, licenses, tax concessions, government con-
tracts, permissions to import, foreign exchange, approval of cartel arrange-
ments" and other benefits to an industry to ensure cooperation.247 Although 
firms vary in their speed and spirit of compliance,248 all Japanese businesses 
regard administrative guidance as a justifiable and necessary means of maintaining 
economic order.249 
Japanese case law holds that administrative guidance is a legitimate exercise of 
governmental power only when an agency can rely on its statutory authority to 
justify the practice.250 In Kondoru Kogyo K.K. v. Nih on, 251 Japanese police directed 
a manufacturer to discontinue production of the toy-guns on the grounds that 
they were illegal under a statute prohibiting the manufacture of weapons.252 The 
court held that administrative guidance in this case was an official government 
action since the police had the statutory authority to compel the manufacturer to 
cease production by issuing an order pursuant to a weapons-control statute.253 
Accordingly, administrative guidance will qualify as a valid government action 
only when the ultimate source of power to compel compliance is statutory.254 
242. MAGAZINER & HOUT. supra note 16, at 41. See generally Yamanouchi, Administrative Guidance and 
the Rule of Law, 7 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 22 (1974). 
243. MAGAZINER & HOUT, supra note 16, at 41. 
244. Ackley & Ishi, Fiscal, Monetary and Related Policies, in ASIA'S NEW GIANT 237 (H. Patrick & H. 
Rosovskyeds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as ASIA'S NEW GIANT). 
245. [d. 
246. MAGAZINER & HOuT,supra note 16 at 41. The government's wishes take the form ofa request, a 
recommendation, or occasionally, an admonition. Jd. 
247. ASIA'S NEw GIANT, supra note 244, at 237. 
248. MAGAZINER & HOUT, supra note 16, at 41. Some adhere to the constitutional right to freedom of 
business authority provided in Article 22 of the Constitution. KENPO (Constitution) art. 22 (Japan). See 
generally Haley, The Freedom to Choose an Occupation and the Constitutional Limits of Legislative Discretion, 8 
LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 188 (1975). 
249. MAGAZINER & HOUT, supra note 16, at 41. 
250. Kondoru K6gy6 K.K. v. Nihon, 27 Kakyu minshu 499 (Tokyo District Court, Aug. 23, 1976). 
See also Warabi K.K. v. Kyoto shi, reprinted in 691 HENREI jIHO 57 (Kyoto District Court,july 14, 1972). 
251. 27 Kakyu minshu 499 (Tokyo District Court, Aug. 23, 1976). 
252. [d. 
253. ld. 
254. [d. 
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3. The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law 
Although MITI has chosen administrative guidance as the initial means for 
implementing voluntary export controls, the agency has the statutory power to 
enforce such an agreement under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Control Law of 1949.255 The overall objective of the Control Law is to promote 
the proper development of foreign trade and to safeguard "the balance of 
international payments and the stability of the currency"256 to maintain "the 
rehabilitation and the expansion of the national economy."257 
Articles 47 and 48258 set forth the basic principle of refraining from export 
restrictions and the conditions providing for approval of such restraints.259 Article 
47 of the Control Law states, as a general principle of free trade, that the "export 
of goods will be permitted with such minimum restrictions thereon as are consis-
tent with the purpose of this law."26o Article 48 provides the Japanese government 
with limited exceptions to Article 4 7: 
[a]ny person desiring to export goods of any designated type, or 
goods destined for any special areas, or to export goods by means of 
any designated form of transaction or payment, may be required to 
obtain the approval of the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry as provided for by Cabinet Order ... [which approval] shall 
be within the limits necessary for the maintenance of the balance of 
international payments and the sound development of international 
trade or the national economy.261 
Thus, in order for MITI to enforce the auto export restrictions under the 
Control Law, the VRA must qualify as a limit necessary for sound international 
trade. 
The court in 1969 Pekin-Shanhai Nihon Kogyo Tenranki v. Nihon (COCOM 
case)262 analyzed the legality of export restrictions pursuant to Article 48. In this 
255. Law No. 228, supra note 226, art. 48. 
256. /d. art. 1. 
257. [d. arts. 47-48. 
258. See Matsushita, Export Control and Export Cartels in Japan, 20 HARV. INT'L L. J. 103 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Matsushita]. 
259. Law No. 228, supra note 226, arts. 47-48. 
260. [d. art. 47. 
261. [d. art. 48(1)-48(2). The check price and quantitative restrictions (quotas) have been the primary 
modes of export restrictions which MITI has used in the exercise of its powers under Article 48 of the 
Control Law. [d. art. 48(2). The check price is a minimum export price usually invoked to prevent 
dumping in the importing nation. Matsushita, supra note 258, at 105. For a general discussion of the 
problem of dumping, see Recent Development, United States Antidumping Procedures under the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979: A Crack in the Dam of Nontariff Barriers, 3 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 223,227 
(1979). The basis for allocating quotas is past export volume, seniority or "good reputation" regarding 
the parties involved. Matsushita, supra note 258, at 106. 
262. 20 Gyosei reishu 842 (Tokyo District Court, July 8, 1969). 
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case, the Association for the 1969 Peking-Shanghai Japanese Industrial Exhibi-
tion challenged MITI's disapproval of the export of various goods to the 
People's Republic of China.263 The court held that MITI's conduct was illegal 
since this action was outside the scope of MITI's powers under the Control 
Law.264 The court interpreted Article 47 as expounding the principle of free 
trade.265 According to this interpretation, free trade is "a right of the people 
which is part of the freedom of business guaranteed to the people as a funda-
mental human right under Article 22 of the Constitution, although such free-
dom should be subject to restrictions for the public welfare."266 The court found 
that the export restriction imposed by MITI did not come under the exception 
of Article 48 because it was not "purely and directly necessary" for the mainte-
nance of the balance of international payments and the sound development of 
international trade of the Japanese economy.267 
The court in the COCOM case acknowledged that the Article 48 test justifies 
export controls in purely economic terms.268 The government had argued that 
to diverge from the COCOM agreement269 would disrupt amicable U.S.-
Japanese relations and lead to economic retaliation by the U.S. and member 
nations, thereby seriously undermining the "sound development of Uapanese] 
international trade and national economy."270 To this contention, the court 
responded that Article 48 would not apply because Japan had entered the 
COCOM agreement for political rather than economic reasons,271 despite the 
indirect economic effect.272 Therefore, Article 48 would not ecompass COCOM 
export restrictions. MITI's export restraints were illegal since this government 
action did not fall within the limited exceptions specified in Article 48.273 Accord-
ing to the court, only export restrictions imposed primarily for economic reasons 
are legally enforceable under Article 48 of the Control Law.274 
263. /d. 
264. Id. 
265. /d. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. See text accompanying note 261 supra. 
268. 20 Gyosei reishu 842 (Tokyo District Court, july 8, 1969). 
269. COCOM (The Consultative Group Coordinating Committee) came into existence in 1950 to 
compile secret lists of items subject to strategic controls if destined for export to the European 
Communist bloc. McQuade, U.S. Trade and Eastern Europe: Its Prospects and Parameters, 3 LAW & POL'y 
INT'L Bus. 42, 72 (1971) [hereinafter cited as McQuade]. The United States first officially recognized its 
participation in COCOM in the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, ch. 575, § 101,65 Stat. 
645 (1951), amended by Export Administration Act of 1979 § 5(i), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(i) (1980). 
270. 20 Gyosei reishu 842 (Tokyo District Court,july 8,1969). Law No. 228 supra note 266, art. 48. 
271. McQuade, supra note 269, at 72. 
272. 20 Gyosei reishu 842 (Tokyo District Court, july 8, 1969). 
273. Id. 
274. /d. 
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D. Analysis 
Although a voluntary restraint agreement may be technically in restraint of 
trade and, hence, illegal under the Sherman Act,275 many variables surround the 
application of the U.S.-Japanese automobile quota which decrease the probabil-
ity of this VRA violating U.S. antitrust law. U.S. courts are likely to uphold a 
VRA against challenges where the exporting nation compels its domestic pro-
ducers to comply with the terms of the agreement. 276 In the case of the U.S. and 
Japanese automobile industries' VRA, this "foreign compulsion" defense is 
available because of the Japanese government's direct involvement in the negoti-
ations and enforcement of the voluntary restraint agreement. 277 
The U.S. and Japanese governments conducted negotiations for the voluntary 
restraint agreement on behalf of the automobile industries in both countries.278 
The U.S. executive branch, without the legislated authority to engage in such 
negotiations, relied exclusively on its inherent constitutional power to conduct 
foreign affairs.279 MIT!, the trade branch of the Japanese government, acted 
within its scope of authority in representing the interests of Japanese automakers 
during the course of the negotiations.28o 
The fact that the voluntary restraint agreement was the product of bilateral 
negotiations greatly minimizes the risk of antitrust liability as long as the 
Japanese government requires "through its legal process compliance by its na-
tional firms."281 Japan has chosen to rely on administrative guidance as a method 
of enforcement. Although administrative guidance is "advisory,"282 MITI has 
exercised a considerable amount of control over the application of the quota.283 
MITI has determined quota limits for individual auto companies based on prior 
ex port levels and has warned that it will monitor the number of car exports to 
evaluate compliance with its demands.284 Failure to adhere to these requirements 
will subject Japanese producers to stricter controls and sanctions under the 
Control Law.285 
The degree of control MITI has exercised in asserting its policy under ad-
275. 15 U.S.C. § I (1973). 
276. See § IV.B.3 supra. See also Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. 
Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
277. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 156 (official letter from Assistant Attorney General John H. 
Shenefield, spokesman for the U.S. Department of Justice). 
278. See § IV.B.3 supra. The Supreme Court decision in Consumers Union supports the conclusion that 
the executive has the necessary authority to negotiate a voluntary restraint agreement under the 
Constitution. 506 F.2d at 143-44. 
279. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
280. Law No. 228, supra note 226, art. 48. See § IV.C.3 supra. 
281. Hearings, (pt. I), supra note 3, at 156. 
282. ASIA'S NEW GIANT, supra note 244, at 237. 
283. Japan Times Weekly, May 9, 1981, at 2, col. 4. 
284. /d. 
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ministrative guidance seems on its face to be compulsion. Nevertheless, since 
administrative guidance is merely a governmental recommendation or request, 
administrative guidance alone would be insufficient to invoke the "foreign com-
pulsion" defense. For enforcement of the quota to qualify as a valid governmen-
tal action, MITI must support administrative direction with its legitimate statu-
tory power. 286 
The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law is MITI's primary 
source of power to impose export restrictions.287 MITI's use of administrative 
guidance to direct Japanese automobile firms to comply with a voluntary quota 
should qualify as a legitimate exercise of governmental power since the ultimate 
power to restrict exports vests in MITI under Article 48 of the Control Law. 288 
Thus, since MITI has support from its statutory authority, private action taken 
in compliance with the agreement would not constitute a collaboration of com-
panies in "restraint of trade" but rather would be a response to a government-
mandated program. Therefore, the voluntary restraint agreement on automo-
biles, officially enforced by the Japanese, should not be struck down on antitrust 
grounds. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has examined the use of the voluntary restraint agreement as 
an effective means of protecting U.S. industry from foreign imports. U.S. auto 
producers believed that the high level of Japanese cars exported to the United 
States289 posed a major threat to the economic recovery of the U.S. auto indus-
try, which reported losses of more than four billion dollars in 1980.290 Negotia-
286. See Konduro Kogyo K.K. v. Nihon, 27 Kakyii minshii 449 (Tokyo District Court, Aug. 23, 
1976). 
287. See § IV.C.3 supra. 
288. Law No. 228, supra note 226, arts. 47-48. The strong limitations on executive discretion in 
Articles 47 and 48 of the japanese legislation raise the question of whether application of the voluntary 
automobile quota is within the scope of its authority under the Control Law. /d. Case law suggests that 
this statute finds justification for export restrictions only if these restrictions avert adverse economic 
effects on japan's balance of payments or development of international trade or the japanese economy. 
1969 Pekin-Shanhai Nihon Kogyo Tenranki v. Nihon, 20 Gyosei reishii 842 (Tokyo District Court,july 
8, 1969). The argument that voluntary controls on automobile exports avoided unilateral action by the 
United States provides a strong practical economic reason for upholding their validity under Japanese 
law. Although the voluntary quota will still have an impact on the japanese economy and international 
trade policy, most Japanese businessmen consider a quota as less economically threatening than the 
unilateral measures which the United States might have taken with the passage of quota legislation. See 
HUNSBERGER,supra note 4, at 235. The fact that japan may relax the voluntary quota progressively each 
year with a view toward its expedient elimination is, in the long run, preferable to the japanese 
economic and industrial policy. /d. at 355. 
289. In 1980, the japanese share of the American car market was 21.3%. Hearings, (pI. II), supra note 
3, at 144 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser, President of United Auto Workers (UAW)). 
290. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1981, at DI, col. 2. Sales of domestic cars were lower in 1980 than in any 
year since 1961. U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note I, at 92. 
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tions between the U.S. and Japanese governments led to the application of a 
VRA, in which Japan voluntarily agreed to enforce a quota limiting its auto 
exports to the United States. This approach is the best means of providing 
import relief to the U.S. automobile industry within the bounds of international 
trade rules and U.S. antitrust law. 
The voluntary quota assumes an intermediate stance between the free trade 
position of GATT and the protectionist leanings of Congress. Because the 
automobile quota is technically voluntary and unilateral on the part of the 
Japanese, the agreement would not violate GATT rules and, hence, would not 
invite retaliation. 
Another major consideration in regulating imports by a voluntary quota 
system is the antitrust implications. This Comment has illustrated the key factors 
which minimize the probability of an antitrust violation. The fact that the 
governments conducted bilateral negotiations for the voluntary restraint agree-
ment and the MITI, the trade branch of the Japanese government, assumed 
responsibility for the enforcement of the quota greatly reduces the possibility of 
a successful antitrust challenge. MITI's advisory role in dealing with the 
Japanese auto industry is sufficiently supported by its statutory power to impose 
export restrictions. Since MITI is implementing the agreement within the scope 
of its statutory authority, the foreign compulsion defense would shelter private 
commercial conduct complying with the terms of the agreement from antitrust 
liability. Thus, the voluntary quota on automobiles has averted the major anti-
trust roadblock and emerged as a respectable substitute for unilateral controls. 
Barbara Anne Sousa 
